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Abstract. I argue that in addressing worries about the validity and reliability of implicit measures of 
social cognition, theorists should draw on research concerning “entitativity perception.” In brief, an 
aggregate of people is perceived as highly “entitative” when its members exhibit a certain sort of 
unity. For example, think of the difference between the aggregate of people waiting in line at a bank 
versus a tight-knit group of friends: the latter seems more “groupy” than the former. I start by arguing 
that entitativity perception modulates the activation of implicit biases and stereotypes. I then argue that 
recognizing this modulatory role will help researchers to address concerns surrounding the validity 
and reliability of implicit measures.    
1 Introduction  
Consider the stark difference between a North Korean military parade, and the people wandering 
around Times Square on a busy day. The collection of people marching in the parade is unified 
in various ways: picture the perfectly synchronized goose-stepping; the matching uniforms; and 
the shared sense of national pride. In contrast, the aggregate of people in Times Square is 
relatively disunified: people are walking in different directions; they don’t know each other; and 
they are there for different reasons. There is some sense in which the former has the property of 
being a group to a greater extent than the latter.  
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In 1958, Campbell tried to capture this intuitive difference by coining the somewhat awkward 
term, “entitativity.” He defined it as the degree to which a collection of people have “the nature 
of an entity” (1958, 17). In addition to outlining a metaphysics of entitativity, Campbell also 
sketched a psychological theory. Drawing on Gestalt principles of perceptual organization, he 
suggested that a group is perceived as highly entitative when its members stand in certain 
relations to one another, such as being in close proximity; being similar; and moving together in 
accordance with shared goals.   
While Campbell’s claims were plausible enough, he did not support them with evidence. In 
fact, his ideas lay dormant until the turn of the century, when social psychologists began to carry 
out experimental work on entitativity perception. Since then, numerous studies have found that 
when we perceive a group, we represent its degree of entitativity (for a review, see Hamilton, 
2007). Various studies have also found that entitativity perception is a key precursor to bias and 
stereotyping. For example, in Crawford and colleagues’ (2002) study, participants observed the 
member of a group as exhibiting some trait (e.g. being lazy). They were then tested on whether 
they associate this trait with other members of the group. Crawford and colleagues found that 
participants were much more likely to do so when they perceived the group as highly entitative.          
By the time empirical work on entitativity perception had taken off, studies of implicit bias 
and implicit stereotyping were well under way. Social psychologists have developed a number of 
implicit measures, such as the Implicit Association Test (Greenwald et al., 1998); the Go/No-Go 
Association Task (Nosek & Banaji, 2001); the Weapon Identification Task (Payne, 2001); the 
Affect Misattribution Procedure (Payne, 2009); the Bona Fide Pipeline (Fazio et al., 1995); and 
the Affective Lexical Priming Score (Lebrecht et al., 2009).   
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It is important to note that theorists use the term “implicit” in various ways. Some use it to 
denote characteristics of the constructs being measured. For example, some use the term to 
denote states that are automatically activated in a way that is inaccessible to introspection (e.g., 
see Greenwald et al., 1998). Others use the term to characterize those measurement procedures 
that are designed to detect biases and stereotypes without relying on self-report (e.g., see De 
Houwer & Moors, 2010). In what follows, I focus on problems surrounding implicit measures of 
biases and stereotypes. In doing so, I remain as neutral as possible regarding the nature of the 
biases and stereotypes being measured (e.g. I do not take a stance on whether they are activated 
in a way that is inaccessible to introspection).     
 A number of meta-analyses have found that implicit measures of biases and stereotypes tend 
to have weak validity and reliability (e.g., see Bar-Anan & Nosek, 2014; Forscher et al., 2019; 
Oswald et al., 2013). Some theorists have reacted by questioning the utility of these measures. 
For example, commenting on the Implicit Association Test, Singal (2017) implores social 
psychologists to “reexamine their decision to devote so much time and energy to this one 
instrument.” Others have suggested that instead of turning their attention away from implicit 
measures of bias and stereotyping, social psychologists should find ways to improve their 
validity and reliability (e.g., see Cooley & Payne, 2017; Gschwendner et al., 2008). In what 
follows, I pursue this second approach. I argue that to improve the validity and reliability of 
implicit measures, social psychologists should draw on research into entitativity perception.       
More specifically, in section 2, I present evidence that entitativity perception modulates the 
activation of implicit biases and stereotypes. In sections 3 and 4, I address concerns surrounding 
the validity and reliability of implicit measures. I start by arguing that implicit biases and 
stereotypes are cross-contextually unstable, in large part, because entitativity perception is 
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context-sensitive. I then argue that the validity and reliability of implicit measures will improve 
if researchers take this source of cross-contextual instability into account. Finally, in section 5, I 
outline an account of how entitativity perception modulates the activation of implicit biases and 
stereotypes.   
2 Entitativity perception as a precursor to implicit bias and stereotyping  
Multiple studies have converged on the view that we really do perceive some groups as more 
entitative than others. In what follows, I review the evidence. I then present additional evidence 
that entitativity perception is a precursor to implicit bias and implicit stereotyping.     
2.1 A folk typology of groups  
In a foundational series of studies, Lickel and colleagues (2000) sought to uncover the features 
that are most predictive of entitativity perception. Participants rated the degree to which various 
collections of people “qualify as a group” (e.g. a family, women, people in line at the bank, etc.). 
Then, in a second study, participants rated these groups on various aspects, such as the similarity 
of its members; the sharing of common goals; and degree of interaction among group members. 
There were two major findings.  
 First, the groups clustered around 5 basic types: (1) intimacy groups (e.g. friendship groups, 
families); (2) task groups (e.g. committees, sporting teams); (3) social categories (e.g. women, 
doctors); (4) loose associations (e.g. people working at the same large factory); and (5) transitory 
groups (e.g. people waiting at a bus stop). Lickel and colleagues’ second major finding was that 
a clear entitativity continuum emerged. Intimacy groups were seen as the most entitative; 
followed by task groups; then social categories; and so on for each successive member in the list 
above.    
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Several studies have replicated these initial findings (for an overview, see Hamilton, 2007). In 
fact, Sherman and colleagues (2002) found that people spontaneously subsume groups under the 
superordinate categories listed above. Additional studies have also found that high-entitative 
groups are not processed in the same way as low-entitative groups. For example, the former are 
processed in a more on-line and “integrative” manner (Hamilton et al. 2002); they are seen as 
more of a threat than low-entitative groups (e.g., see Fessler & Holbrook, 2016); they are seen as 
having more agency than low-entitative groups (Tanibe et al., 2019); and they are seen as having 
greater collective responsibility for the actions of individual members (Abelson et al., 1998; 
Leonard, 2019; Lickel et al., 2003; Newheiser et al., 2012).   
2.2 Implicit stereotyping   
In addition to all these differences, high-entitative groups are stereotyped more than low-
entitative groups. In a seminal study, Crawford and colleagues (2002) deployed a modified 
version of the savings-in-relearning paradigm: the core assumption being that it is easier to 
relearn previously learned associations than it is to form brand new ones.  
Participants viewed 32 photographs of individuals drawn from two groups. In the exposure 
task, each photograph was paired with a description of some trait-implicative behavior (e.g. 
solving a complex mathematical problem). Half of the members of each group were paired with 
behaviors that implied one trait (e.g. aggressiveness), while the other half were paired with 
behaviors that implied a different trait (e.g. intelligence). Each group was then described in terms 
that implied either high or low entitativity. For example, members of low entitative groups were 
described as having “different opinions,” and as acting “in a different manner” across a variety of 
situations (2002, 1080).  
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In the paired associates task, the 32 photographs were presented to participants again; 
however, each photograph was now paired with a trait term. Participants were instructed to 
remember each photograph-word pairing. Importantly, half of the photographs were paired with 
a trait term that matched the description given during the exposure task. For example, an 
individual that was initially described as solving a complex mathematical problem was paired 
with the term “intelligent.” These were referred to as trait inference trials. The other photographs 
were paired with the trait term that was associated with other members of the relevant group, but 
not with the individual in question. For example, suppose each member of group A was 
described as exhibiting either intelligent or aggressive behavior during the exposure task. In that 
case, if a given group member was described as solving a complex mathematical problem during 
the exposure task, they were paired with the term “aggressive,” not the term “intelligent.” These 
were referred to as trait transference trials.    
In the cued-recall task, each photograph was presented to participants again. They were told 
to write down the word that appeared on the photograph during the paired associates task. 
What Crawford and colleagues found was that for trait inference trials, recall of photograph-
word pairs was most accurate for low entitative groups. For example, suppose S was described as 
solving a complex mathematical problem during the exposure task, before being paired with the 
term “intelligent” during the paired associates task. In that case, participants were better at 
remembering the latter pairing when S was the member of a low entitative group.  
In contrast, for trait transference trials, recall of photograph-word pairs was most accurate for 
high entitative groups. For example, suppose the description of S’s behavior during the initial 
exposure task did not imply laziness; whereas, the description of fellow-group member T’s 
behavior did imply laziness. Moreover, suppose S’s photograph was paired with the word “lazy” 
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during the paired associates task. In that case, participants were better at remembering the pair, 
<S, lazy>, when the group S and T both belonged to was highly entitative.  
Overall, this pattern of results provides evidence that perceiving a group as highly entitative 
leads to the stereotyping of its members (for similar findings, see Spencer-Rodgers et al., 2007; 
Susskind et al., 1999; Yzerbyt et al., 1998). According to Crawford and colleagues’ model, the 
members of those groups that are perceived as highly entitative are seen as interchangeable. 
Thus, a group impression is formed based on the trait-implying behaviors of individual members. 
This impression is then spontaneously transferred to others in the group, even if they have not 
been observed exhibiting a behavior that is indicative of this trait. In contrast, for groups that are 
perceived as low in entitativity, members are processed as individuals. Thus, if one member is 
seen as exhibiting a trait-implying behavior, the trait in question does not become associated 
with other group members.   
2.3 Implicit bias   
Other experimental paradigms provide evidence that people tend to harbor implicit biases against 
highly entitative groups. Gaertner and colleagues (2008) told people that they were participating 
in an experiment about people’s reactions to noise exposure. Participants sat next to two 
confederates and filled out a form, before a third confederate entered the room. In the low-
entitativity condition, the two seated confederates remained silent. In the high-entitativity 
condition, one of them acknowledged the third confederate, and remarked on a volleyball game, 
saying, “We weren’t sure if you would make the game.” The third confederate replied, “I would 
not miss a game.” To further enhance perceived entitativity, the confederates also wore the same 
shirt in this condition: it had the words “Bryan-College-Station Volleyball: Team United” printed 
on it. The experimenter then returned to announce that a mistake had been made, and that they 
 8 
only needed three participants. In the rejection condition, one of the confederates glared at the 
participant and said scornfully, “S/he should be the one that leaves!” In the no-rejection 
condition, the participant was excluded via the drawing of cards, which were rigged to ensure 
rejection.   
 In one study, participants were then invited to fill in for an absent experimenter. The 
participants’ job was to control the noise level to which the other “participants” were exposed. 
They were told that, when prompted, they should adjust the volume to a level anywhere between 
0 to 110 dB, where 110 dB would cause “significant discomfort.” Having chosen a volume, 
participants then rated the degree to which the other “participants” constituted a group.  
 Gaertner and colleagues found that the mean volume selected by participants was the highest 
when they were rejected by, what they perceived to be, a highly entitative group. Interestingly, 
the mean volume selected by participants was the lowest when they were rejected by, what they 
perceived to be, a low entitative group; while the mean volumes selected in the two no-rejection 
conditions were somewhere in between. Gaertner and colleagues conclude that when participants 
are rejected by the member of a group that they perceive as highly entitative, they associate 
rejection with the group itself, and retaliate accordingly.  
 In a second study, the same set-up was used; however, rather than filling in for an absent 
experimenter, participants were asked to complete a version of the Implicit Association Test 
(IAT). The IAT is designed to measure the strength of association between social concepts (e.g. 
BLACK or WHITE) and valenced concepts (e.g. PLEASANT or UNPLEASANT). In Gaertner and 
colleagues’ version of the IAT, participants saw words and photographs on a computer screen. 
The instructions indicated that all and only those people wearing the shirt with “Team United” 
printed on it are members of Team United. In a series of trials, participants were tasked with 
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categorizing the words as either good or bad, and the photographed individuals as either Team 
United members or not Team United members. As in the first study, the participants were also 
asked to rate the degree to which the other “participants” in the study constituted a group.  
 Gaertner and colleagues found that those participants who were rejected by a member of 
Team United during the first phase of the study exhibited the least favorable associations with 
Team United. For example, these participants were the most likely to associate the words 
“horrible” and “nasty” with members of Team United. Participants who were either not rejected, 
or were rejected by what they perceived to be a low entitative group, were less likely to associate 
negative words with members of Team United.    
3 Validity, reliability, and concept accessibility  
I have provided evidence that entitativity perception modulates the encoding and activation of 
implicit biases and stereotypes. In what follows, I argue that by further examining this role, we 
can address some of the main concerns surrounding the validity and reliability of implicit 
measures.  
3.1 Validity and reliability  
Various meta-analyses have found that, on average, implicit measures have weak predictive 
validity: that is, they are relatively poor predictors of behavior (e.g., see Forscher et al., 2019; 
Oswald et al., 2013). Other meta-analyses have found that, on average, implicit measures have 
low test-retest reliability: that is, individual’s scores vary considerably over time (e.g., see Bar-
Anan & Nosek, 2014; Gawronski et al., 2017).   
 In addressing these concerns, a number of theorists have turned their attention to the context-
sensitive manner in which implicit attitudes are expressed (see Barden et al., 2004; Brownstein et 
al., 2020; Cooley & Payne, 2017; Gschwendner et al., 2008; Jost, 2019; Payne et al., 2017). For 
 10 
example, Cooley and Payne (2017) found that both the predictive validity and test-retest 
reliability of the Affective Misattribution Procedure were significantly enhanced when images of 
social groups were used instead of images depicting a lone member. They argue that an image of 
a group activates relevant biases and stereotypes more effectively than an image of a lone group 
member, because the former is seen as more typical of the given social category (2016, 48). 
Moreover, relative to groups, individuals belong to myriad social categories. Thus, when 
observing an individual, which stereotypes and biases are activated will depend on which social 
categories are salient; and this, in turn, will fluctuate with the subject’s temporary mood, goals, 
and immediately prior experiences (2016, 46).   
 In a similar vein, Gschwendner et al. (2008) gave German participants a version of the IAT, in 
which they were exposed to images of both German and Turkish faces. In the experimental 
condition, there was an image of a mosque in the background; whereas, in the control condition, 
there was an image of a garden. The stability of participants’ scores was assessed over a two 
week period. Participants in the control condition exhibited a low stability coefficient of 0.29, 
whereas participants in the experimental condition exhibited a high stability coefficient of 0.72. 
Gschwendner et al. (2008) conclude that the image of the mosque enhanced the accessibility of 
the concept, TURKISH, and thereby enhanced the accessibility of any biases participants 
harbored against Turkish people. More generally, they suggest that the reliability of implicit 
measures will be stronger when (i) repeated measurements are taken in the same context, and (ii) 
the context is such that the construct being measured is highly accessible, i.e. it is highly poised 
for use in cognitive processing (2008, 71).      
 In sum, then, the studies outlined above suggest that there are important constraints on the 
activation of implicit biases and stereotypes. In what follows, I argue that by drawing on studies 
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of entitativity perception, researchers can gain a greater understanding of how these constraints 
work. More specifically, I will argue that entitativity perception modulates the activation of 
implicit biases and stereotypes by making the relevant social categories more accessible. 
However, entitativity perception is context-sensitive. Thus, in designing implicit measures that 
are valid and reliable, researchers should ensure that entitativity cues are salient and stable.       
3.2 Entitativity perception and top-down salience effects  
Recall the folk typology of groups uncovered by Lickel and colleagues (2000). Intimacy groups 
are perceived as the most entitative; followed by task groups; then social categories; then loose 
associations; and finally, transitory groups.   
Notice, however, that membership in each group-type is graded. To some degree, my social 
soccer team counts as a task group (e.g. we want to win games together); but it also counts as an 
intimacy group to a significant degree too (e.g. we are friends). Similarly, consider a group of 
people boarding a plane. This counts as a transitory group. However, in lining up, members of 
the group must coordinate their actions to some degree: the group therefore counts as a task 
group to a non-negligible degree.   
We can therefore think of the different group-types as different dimensions along which 
groups are seen as varying. A group’s position along each dimension will be determined by the 
degree to which it possesses certain features. For example, Lickel and colleagues (2000) found 
that people see quality of interaction as determining membership in an intimacy group; whereas, 
for task groups, they see the sharing of goals as the key determinant. Given that groups vary 
along these different dimensions—possessing these diagnostic features to different degrees—we 
should expect to observe salience effects.   
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For example, suppose you are comparing the average career of a police officer with the 
average career of a fire fighter. You do so by comparing day-to-day duties, salaries, benefits, and 
so on. In this context, the salient features of each group are diagnostic of social categories. This 
means that you are likely to perceive both groups as relatively low in entitativity.1 But consider a 
different context in which you are reading an article about tensions between the police and 
certain communities (e.g. tensions that have arisen because of police shootings, racial profiling, 
or the treatment of protestors). In this context, those features that are diagnostic of task and 
intimacy groups will be more salient. For example, the article you are reading might invoke the 
so-called “code of silence”; the various goals that police officers share; and the coordinated 
activities they engage in when dealing with rioters and protesters. Given the salience of these 
features, you probably see police officers as constituting a more entitative group than you did in 
the first context.    
 Direct evidence for the context-sensitivity of entitativity perception comes from a study by 
Bangerter (2005). Participants were asked to rate the entitativity of various age groups. 
Importantly, though, Bangerter varied the way in which each age group was labelled. In some 
cases, generational labels were used (e.g. “Baby Boomers”). In other cases, age-labels were used 
(e.g. “People who are about 75 years old”). Cohort-labels were also used (e.g. “People born 
between 1945 and 1950”).  
 There were two key findings. First, age groups were seen as the least entitative when they 
were labelled as a cohort. For example, the group consisting of Baby Boomers was seen as more 
entitative when labelled as “Baby Boomers” than it was when labelled as “People born between 
 
1 Below, I consider a different form of entitativity perception, which I refer to as “categorical 
entitativity perception.” There is evidence that some social categories are perceived as high in 
“categorical entitativity,” even if they are not highly entitative in the sense operative above.     
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1946 and 1964.” The second key finding was that labelling had an effect on whether certain 
features were utilized as entitativity cues. For instance, when a group was labelled in 
generational terms, common goals and values were predictors of entitativity perception. 
However, when labelled in terms of age, these same features were not utilized as entitativity 
cues.   
 If the way in which an age group is labelled can determine whether certain features are 
processed as entitativity cues, it is very likely that entitativity perception will vary with other 
aspects of the context. For example, suppose we are debating whether “Ok, Boomer” should be 
regarded as a slur. The various tensions that exist between Baby Boomers and younger 
generations therefore loom large (e.g. tensions surrounding who is responsible for the global 
financial crisis in 2008; who is responsible for climate inaction; etc.). In this sort of context, the 
goals and values that Baby Boomers purportedly share will be salient, thereby making this 
generational group seem more entitative than it does in other contexts (e.g. a context in which we 
are discussing intergenerational differences in health).    
 Additional evidence that entitativity perception is context-sensitive comes from studies of 
racial categorization. Some studies have found that racial groups are perceived as relatively low 
in entitativity (see Haslam et al., 2000; Lickel et al., 2000). Invariably, though, these studies ask 
participants to rate the entitativity of different racial groups without putting them into a wider 
context; rather, the groups usually appear on a list with other groups, e.g. “Women,” “Doctors,” 
“Citizens of the US,” etc. If, for example, tensions between the members of different racial 
groups are made salient, we should expect these groups to be seen as more entitative than they 
are in the sorts of studies just described.   
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Support for this hypothesis comes from a study by Pietraszewski (2016). Participants were 
presented with a series of photographs in which different individuals were depicted as making 
various statements. Half the depicted individuals were Black; while the other half were White. 
Some of the individuals’ statements indicated that they worked for the same charity; however, 
membership in the charity cut across racial lines. After completing a 1-minute distractor task, the 
photographs were presented to participants again; only this time, all of the photographs appeared 
simultaneously, and there was only one statement shown in the middle of the screen. The 
participants’ task was to indicate who issued the statement in question.   
Importantly, two conditions were included. In the prime condition, participants viewed a 
series of photographs during the distractor task. These photographs depicted racial conflict. The 
participants were also asked to think of “all the racial conflict and inequality you have been 
exposed to or are aware of” (2016, 87). In the nonprime condition, the distractor task involved 
naming US state capitals, while viewing a map of the US.   
 Pietraszewski found that when recalling who said what, participants were far more likely to 
confuse members of the same racial group in the prime condition than in the nonprime condition. 
Recall that in the nonprime condition, the only salient alliance was the charity group, which cut 
across racial lines. According to Pietraszewski, this is evidence that we are predisposed to detect 
and track those groups that constitute alliances. This explains why members of same racial group 
were conflated more in the prime condition than they were in the nonprime condition: it is 
because they were processed as members of the same alliance in the prime condition, not as 
individuals. In the nonprime condition, members of the same racial group were not processed as 
members of the same alliance, because the only salient alliance (i.e. the charity group) cut across 
racial lines.   
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For our purposes, the key finding is that in one context, attention to the relevant features can 
cause people see racial groups as highly entitative; whereas, in a different context, in which 
attention is not drawn to the relevant features, the same racial groups are not processed as highly 
entitative.      
In sum, the degree to which a group is seen as entitative will vary with the context, and which 
kinds of features are salient. Moreover, given that most (if not all) groups tend to vary along each 
of the dimensions identified by Lickel and colleagues (2000), context-sensitivity is probably a 
ubiquitous feature of social categorization. This has important implications for the validity and 
reliability of implicit measures. As was explained above, biases and stereotypes are more likely 
to be activated when the target group is seen as highly entitative. If entitativity perception is 
sensitive to contextual factors, it follows that the activation of biases and stereotypes is sensitive 
to these same factors. Thus, there are good reasons for thinking that if researchers make 
entitativity cues highly salient, the validity and reliability of implicit measures will improve.   
3.2.1 Bottom-up salience effects  
In most of the examples given above, entitativity perception was modulated in a top-down 
manner. For example, thinking about racial conflict caused people to see racial groups as more 
entitative than they would otherwise. However, bottom-up factors are also an important source of 
context-sensitivity.   
Phillips and colleagues (2018) examined the automatic processes that are triggered when 
one’s visual field is populated by a group of people. Across multiple studies, participants were 
presented with sets of four faces. In each trial, an initial set of faces was briefly presented, 
followed by a set of different faces. In the first study, participants were tasked with specifying 
which set of faces is more racially diverse. In the second study, the task was to specify which set 
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is more diverse in terms of gender. Finally, in the third study, the task was to specify which set is 
the most hierarchical.    
By displaying the faces for only 200 ms before backward masking them, Phillips and 
colleagues were able to test the hypothesis that we extract information about groups using 
ensemble coding. Observers use ensemble-coding to extract the central tendency of a set of 
objects (e.g. their average speed or color) in a rapid, parallel, manner (Ariely, 2001; Haberman & 
Whitney, 2009). Two-hundred milliseconds is too fast for more than a single saccade (Thorpe et 
al., 1996). Thus, by limiting presentation times to 200 ms, Phillips and colleagues were able to 
prevent participants from processing the faces in a serial manner. To extract accurate group-level 
impressions, participants would need to utilize an ensemble-coding mechanism.  
Phillips and colleagues found that participants were above chance in detecting the more 
hierarchical groups, as well as the more diverse groups, even though presentation times 
prevented serial processing. This constitutes evidence that group-impressions are formed rapidly, 
based on low-level visual cues.  
As Phillips and colleagues (2014, 116) point out, there is evidence that groups are perceived 
as more entitative when they are perceived as homogenous (see Hamilton, 2007). Thus, visually 
perceiving a group as exhibiting low variability with respect to certain features may enhance 
perceptions of entitativity. There are various studies that provide independent support for this 
claim. For example, there is evidence that groups whose members exhibit the same facial 
expression are perceived as highly entitative (Magee & Tiedens, 2006). There is also evidence 
that groups whose members exhibit synchronous movements are perceived as highly entitative 
(Fessler & Holbrook, 2016; Ip et al., 2009; Lakens, 2010; Lakens & Stel, 2011; Wilson & Gos, 
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2019). In all these cases, the impression of entitativity is based on a visible feature that exhibits 
low variability across the group.    
These findings point to another way in which entitativity perception varies across contexts, 
for as Phillips and colleagues (2018) point out, ensemble coding is only triggered when multiple 
group members are present in one’s visual field. In those contexts in which the relevant cues are 
not visible, let alone salient, entitativity perception will therefore be dampened.    
For instance, in most versions of the IAT, members of the same group are displayed in 
succession, not at the same time. What’s more, they are presented as disembodied 2D faces. 
Given that entitativity perception is attenuated in these sorts of contexts, the accessibility of the 
relevant biases and stereotypes will be attenuated too: the result will be implicit measures with 
weak validity and reliability.  
The study by Cooley and Payne (2017) illustrates this point. Recall their finding that when 
participants observed images depicting multiple members of a social group, rather than just a 
lone member, this enhanced the validity and reliability of the Affective Misattribution Procedure. 
Given that entitativity cues were more visually salient when multiple group members were 
depicted, it is not surprising that the relevant biases became more accessible.     
Thus, future studies should directly examine the role that visual cues play in driving 
entitativity perception across contexts, for the cross-contextual instability of implicit biases and 
stereotypes is likely explained, in large part, by the varying salience of these cues. Moreover, 
studies of this sort should focus on the kinds of everyday contexts in which people process 
groups. For example, in cities with relatively high levels of racial segregation (by neighborhood, 
school, etc.), same-race individuals are often seen walking together, playing together, greeting 
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one another, and so on.2 People living in these sorts of cities will see the relevant racial groups as 
more entitative when these cues are visible to them (for a relevant discussion, see Enos, 2017).        
4 The dynamical/categorical distinction  
In explaining the role that entitativity perception plays in modulating the activation of biases and 
stereotypes, I have been focusing on the notion of entitativity that falls out of Lickel and 
colleagues’ (2000) pioneering work. Some theorists have argued that we should recognize a 
second notion of entitativity. In what follows, I review the evidence in favor of this view. I argue 
that it provides us with additional resources for understanding the conditions under which 
implicit biases and stereotypes are activated.     
4.1 Two ways of thinking about groups  
In a series of studies, Ip and colleagues (2006) asked participants to watch animations, which 
depicted creatures on another planet. In one condition, creatures in the same group had the same 
skin color. In another condition, they had different skin colors; however, they exhibited 
synchronous movements. Participants rated each groups’ degree of entitativity, as well as the 
degree to which its members shared traits or common goals.   
Ip and colleagues found that the perception of physical similarity predicted the perception of 
entitativity, where this was mediated by the perception of common traits, but not common goals. 
They also found that the perception of synchronous movement predicted the perception of 
entitativity, but this was mediated by the perception of common goals, not common traits. Ip and 
colleagues conclude that there are “two different routes” to entitativity perception.   
 
2 For data on racial segregation in US cities, see https://www.brookings.edu/blog/the-
avenue/2017/12/08/metro-areas-are-still-racially-segregated/ 
 
 19 
Rutchick and colleagues (2008) extended these findings by manipulating the way in which 
participants thought about the unity of a target group. In the categorical condition, they were 
asked to imagine a set of bees flying around the room. They were then told to think about the 
individual bees as members of the general category “bees.” To reinforce the idea that 
membership in the category is determined by the possession of certain physical traits, they were 
shown a taxonomical chart.   
In the dynamic condition, participants were asked to think about the individual bees in terms 
of their role in a functioning beehive. To reinforce the idea that membership in the hive is 
determined by each bee’s contribution to the group’s “goals,” participants were shown diagrams 
that illustrated the specific roles of different bees.  
Participants then learned about three different groups: a Bhutanese social caste; an American 
political party; and a group of students in Missouri. In one study, participants were asked to list 
the three most important things about each group. In a second study, participants were asked to 
rate the entitativity of each one.  
Rutchick and colleagues found that in the categorical condition, participants attended to the 
degree of physical similarity between group members; whereas, in the dynamic condition, they 
attended to the degree of interaction among group members. Rutchick and colleagues also found 
that these differences in attention drove perceptions of entitativity. For example, they found that 
in the categorical condition, seeing members of the high school group as similar predicted 
entitativity perception; whereas, in the dynamic condition, seeing members of this group as 
interactive predicted entitativity perception.   
Like Ip and colleagues (2006), Rutchick and colleagues conclude that there are two kinds of 
entitativity perception, which are based on the two different ways of thinking about groups: 
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namely, as “categorical” or as “dynamical” (see also Brewer et al., 2004; Haslam et al., 2000; 
Wilder & Simon, 1998). Call these two forms of entitativity perception, “categorical entitativity 
perception” and “dynamical entitativity perception.”   
It makes sense that we tend to reify groups in these two ways. If the members of a group are 
highly similar, this raises the probability that they share certain underlying traits, which thereby 
imbues the category in question with inductive potential (see Rothbart & Taylor, 1992; Yzerbyt 
et al., 1997). This sort of entitativity perception drives “psychological essentialism”: the 
tendency to construe the members of a homogenous group as sharing a hidden trait or “essence” 
(see Gelman, 2003). By the same token, if the members of a group exhibit a high degree of 
synchronous movement, this raises the probability that they shared certain goals or norms, which 
thereby imbues the given category with inductive potential.    
4.2 Top-down salience effects    
By distinguishing between dynamical and categorical entitativity perception, we can deepen our 
understanding of the conditions under which biases and stereotypes are activated. To see why, 
consider a study by Spencer-Rodgers and colleagues (2007). They examined the stereotypes that 
people harbor about two kinds of groups: task groups and social categories. The former are high 
in dynamical entitativity, while the latter are often high in categorical entitativity. Spencer-
Rodgers and colleagues found that entitativity perception mediates stereotyping for both types of 
groups. Interestingly, though, they found that the stereotypes differ in systematic ways. 
Compared to participants’ stereotypes about task groups, their stereotypes about social categories 
were richer. Most notably, the latter included more physical attributes (e.g. tanned and blonde for 
Californians); more typical behaviors (e.g. play basketball for African Americans); and more 
references to contextual objects (e.g. brief cases for career women). In addition to being less 
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rich, participants’ stereotypes about task groups tended to focus more on the groups’ goals and 
achievements (e.g. won the world series for New York Yankees). 
There are other key differences in the way that stereotyping is modulated by each form of 
entitativity perception. For example, there is evidence that when a group is perceived as high in 
entitativity, members are seen as responsible for each other’s actions (Gaertner et al., 2008; 
Lickel et al., 2003; Leonard, 2019; Newheiser et al., 2012). Importantly, though, this sort of 
effect appears to be modulated by dynamical entitativity perception, not categorical entitativity 
perception. As some theorists have suggested, a natural explanation of this fact is that dynamical 
groups are seen as having agency in a way that categorical groups are not (Malle, 2010; 
Newheiser et al., 2010, p. 935; see also Tanibe et al., 2019).     
Some studies have also found that those groups that are perceived as high in dynamical 
entitativity are perceived as a threat. For example, Fessler and Holbrook (2016) got participants 
to listen to the footsteps of marching soldiers. When the footsteps were synchronous, participants 
judged the group of soldiers to be more physically formidable, where this was mediated by 
dynamical entitativity perception (see also Callahan & Ledgerwood, 2016; Winegard & Deaner, 
2010). Like those described above, this study suggests that dynamical entitativity perception 
modulates group impressions in unique ways.   
Putting this all together, then, the evidence suggests that implicit biases and stereotypes are 
driven by both categorical and dynamical entitativity perception; however, these forms of 
entitativity perception generate different kinds of biases and stereotypes. Given that which type 
of entitativity perception one engages in varies with the context, it follows that which types of 
biases and stereotypes are activated will vary with the context too.     
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To illustrate, consider racial groups again. If the context is such that one is thinking about 
racial groups in dynamical terms, one’s attention will be guided towards certain features. For 
example, perhaps one is thinking about tensions between the police force and the African 
American community. Given that one is construing African Americans in dynamical terms, this 
will lead to the encoding and activation of certain stereotypes, such as the stereotypic expectation 
that African Americans are likely to affiliate with one another; to have similar goals; and to 
engage in coordinated action. It will also lead to the encoding and activation of specific sorts of 
biases, such as the tendency to hold the group responsible for the actions of individual members 
(see Gaertner et al., 2008; Lickel et al., 2003; Leonard, 2019; Newheiser et al., 2012), or the 
tendency to see the group as a threat (e.g., see Fessler & Holbrook, 2016).   
 If, however, the context is such that one has not been primed to think of racial groups in 
dynamical terms, attention will go to those features that drive categorical entitativity perception. 
As the work by Spencer-Rodgers and colleagues (2007) suggests, this will lead to the encoding 
and activation of a richer suite of associations. For example, it may activate stereotypic 
expectations concerning psycho-behavioral tendencies, such as being aggressive or being 
athletic.      
The developmental evidence provides indirect support for this claim. When exposed to 
generic language about social groups (e.g. “African Americans are X,” “Girls love pink,” etc.), 
both children and adults tend to construe these groups in categorical terms. This leads to 
stereotypic expectations concerning common psycho-behavioral traits (Rhodes, 2012). However, 
when young children are not exposed to generic language, they tend to construe social categories 
in dynamical terms. This leads to stereotypic expectations concerning affiliative behavior. For 
example, Shutts and colleagues (2013) found that 4-year-olds use gender and race to predict 
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friendships; however, they only use these categories to predict similar psycho-behavioral 
tendencies when primed with generic language. This fits with the view, defended above, 
according to which stereotypic expectations vary across contexts because which type of 
entitativity perception one engages in varies across contexts as well.   
4.3 Bottom-up salience effects   
Once again, researchers should also be careful to distinguish between those factors that drive 
entitativity perception in a top-down manner, and those that drive it in a bottom-up manner. 
Recall that entitativity perception is enhanced when multiple group members are visible; and 
when certain features are seen as exhibiting low variability across the group. In the context of the 
dynamical/categorical distinction, this provides us with additional ways in which to explain the 
cross-contextual instability of implicit biases. For example, if the members of a group are 
moving in synchrony (e.g. walking together), this may enhance dynamical entitativity 
perception. If, however, members of the group are not seen as moving in synchrony, this will 
dampen dynamical entitativity perception and enhance categorical entitativity perception: 
observers will thereby devote more attention to physical similarities between group members. In 
fact, this is exactly what Ip and colleagues (2006) found in the study described above. When 
group members moved in synchrony, this fueled dynamic entitativity perception; however, when 
this cue was absent, attention went to similarities in skin color, which fueled categorical 
entitativity perception.  
Thus, in designing implicit measures, researchers should control for both (i) which type of 
entitativity perception is being cued (dynamical or categorical), and (ii) whether entitativity 
perception is being cued in a top-down or a bottom-up manner. It is likely that different sorts of 
cues make the relevant biases and stereotypes accessible to different degrees. Examining these 
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differences in accessibility will enable researchers to design implicit measures with more validity 
and reliability. For example, it is possible that dynamical entitativity perception is strongest 
when members of the target group are visually perceived as engaging in coordinated action. If so, 
biases concerning perceived threat, collective responsibility, and so on, may be more accessible, 
and thus more predictive of behavior, when these sorts of cues are present.   
5 How entitativity perception modulates accessibility   
I have been arguing that entitativity perception modulates the activation of the biases and 
stereotypes that implicit measures are designed to detect. But how does entitativity perception 
play this modulatory role? The notion of conceptual centrality may be helpful here.    
According to prototype theory, concepts encode sets of weighted features. There are different 
views on what determines the weight of a feature, and how the weights determine membership in 
the relevant category. Nonetheless, it is widely agreed that some features are encoded as more 
“central” than others. If, for example, f is relatively central, this means that other features depend 
on it more than it depends on them (Sloman et al., 1998; Thagard, 1989). Take Del Pinal and 
Spaulding’s (2018, 100) example of the concept CHAIR. This concept encodes the features 
+HAS A BACK and +USED FOR SITTING. However, +USED FOR SITTING is more central 
than +HAS A BACK because the former explains the latter.  
 When it comes to your prototype of a given group, which features are central will depend on 
how you are thinking about the group. For example, if you construe it as an intimacy group, 
affiliative bonds will be among the most centrally encoded features, for these explain other 
features of the group, such as the close proximity of its members, as well as their friendliness 
towards one another. If, however, you construe the group as a task group, shared goals will be 
 25 
encoded as central, for these will explain group members’ tendency towards coordinated action; 
joint attention; and so on.  
 Given that different features will be encoded as central for different types of groups, this can 
explain why the activation of implicit biases and stereotypes is constrained by perceived group 
type, as well as the group’s degree of perceived entitativity.  
For example, suppose you are in a context in which you are thinking of some racial group as 
an alliance. As a result, you perceive the group as high in dynamical entitativity, representing the 
sharing of certain goals as central. These representations thereby constrain your stereotypic 
expectations about members’ behavior. For example, you expect to observe various forms of 
affiliative behavior; however, these expectations do not necessarily extend to irrelevant traits, 
such as being athletic or being tall. Thus, at the encoding stage, attention will go to those features 
that are cues for dynamical entitativity—recall that this is what Rutchick and colleagues (2008) 
found when they primed participants to think of the target group as an alliance. This attentional 
bias will result in associations between the target group and alliance-based traits: associations 
that are highly accessible when the relevant alliance cues are salient.    
If, on the other hand, the context is such that you are thinking of this racial group as a social 
category, shared goals will not be represented as central. Which features you represent as central 
will depend on the degree to which you see its members as homogenous, i.e. the degree to which 
you perceive the group as being high in categorical entitativity. If you see the group as very 
homogenous then this raises the probability that you are representing its members as possessing 
some hidden trait (or essence) that explains the observed homogeneity. Given that this trait (or 
essence) is hidden, its nature will be somewhat opaque. For this reason, Medin and Ortony 
(1989) refer to the folk notion of an essence as a “placeholder notion”: one believes that 
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members of the given category possess an essence without knowing exactly what this essence 
consists in. This might explain why stereotyping is more promiscuous for social categories than 
it is for intimacy and task groups. For intimacy and task groups, the features that are represented 
as central are affiliative bonds and shared goals: this puts relatively tight constraints on 
stereotypic expectations. In contrast, for many social categories, the features that count as central 
are largely unknown. Thus, one’s representations of the relevant dependencies will be somewhat 
schematic. Given the schematic nature of these representations, they will put relatively loose 
constraints on stereotypic expectations.    
For example, if you are perceiving the given racial group as high in categorical entitativity, 
your stereotypic expectations may encompass various physical features, as well as various 
psycho-behavioral dispositions. Thus, at the encoding stage, attention will go to these sorts of 
features, not the sorts of features that are cues for dynamical entitativity perception (e.g. cues for 
shared attention; coordinated action; and so on). Moreover, the associations that are encoded as a 
result of this attentional bias will be more accessible when categorical entitativity cues are salient 
(i.e. when similarities between group members are salient).3        
6 Conclusion   
I have argued that entitativity perception modulates the activation of biases and stereotypes; and 
that by recognizing this fact, researchers will be able to design implicit measures with stronger 
validity and reliability.   
Examining the relation between entitativity perception and implicit social cognition will likely 
have other payoffs as well. For example, some studies have found that moving in synchrony with 
 
3 There is, of course, much more to be said about the cognitive architecture underlying the 
accessibility of implicit biases and stereotypes. Various models could be applied to the general picture I 
have just sketched. For a brief discussion of relevant models, see Payne et al. (2017, 235).  
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the members of an outgroup can reduce both implicit and explicit biases against them (see 
Atherton et al., 2019; Farmer & Maister, 2017). Given that synchronous movement is a cue for 
dynamical entitativity perception, this is not surprising. In further examining the effectiveness of 
different interventions, future studies should be sensitive to the distinction between dynamical 
and categorical entitativity perception, including the various cues that trigger their activation 
across contexts.   
 Research on entitativity perception may also deepen our understanding of cross-cultural 
differences in the kinds of implicit biases and stereotypes that are encoded. Kurebayashi and 
colleagues (2012) found that Japanese individuals tend to engage in dynamical entitativity 
perception more than American individuals; whereas, American individuals tend engage in 
categorical entitativity perception more than Japanese individuals. If what I have argued is right, 
we should expect to find differences in the kinds of implicit biases and stereotypes that Japanese 
and American individuals tend to harbor.    
 Finally, I have been focusing on implicit measures of social cognition, but some of the studies 
mentioned above found that entitativity perception modulates the encoding and activation of 
explicit attitudes too (e.g., see Ip et al., 2006; Rutchick et al., 2008; Spencer-Rodgers et al., 
2007). Thus, even though explicit attitudes are often thought to be more stable than implicit 
attitudes (e.g., see Gawronski et al., 2017), entitativity perception is likely an important source of 
context-sensitivity for both.  
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